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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the explicit linkage in the recent work of Habermas between 
cosmopolitanism and the constitutionalization of international law. Whereas previous 
thinking on the constitutionalization of international law has tended either towards the 
utopianism of world government or the modest ambition of  attaching the constitutional label 
to certain material developments in transnational regulation – in particular   the human rights 
regimes and the institutional structure of the UN  as developed through state agreement – 
Habermas looks for an intermediate solution. This would involve a modest range of 
institutions and functions at the global level, in particular around peace and human rights, but 
founded on a broader and more popular basis than state agreement. The  potential and 
urgency of the Habermas proposal lies in  its opposition less to the  other constitutional 
visions and more to the  alternative and increasingly tangible prospect of  a lop-sided 
international regime dominated by American perspectives. 
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1. Introduction  
To try to situate Jurgen Habermas in the debate over the development of a new cosmopolitan 
project for the international order is already to court a significant ambiguity. On the one hand, 
on the basis of his corpus of academic work Habermas is, quite simply, probably the most 
influential social theorist (broadly understood) of his generation. There are few if any 
significant streams of thought in transnational sociology, international political theory, 
international relations and international legal theory which do not today invoke his work as a 
reference point, whether affirmatively or critically,  and, of course, the same has long been 
true of the domestic state- or society-bound domains of these disciplines. On the other, hand, 
Jurgen Habermas is also a prominent global public intellectual of our times. His formidable 
intellectual reputation has given him a platform from which he may pronounce on a wide 
variety of matters of political moment and moral concern; where, to put it crudely, he is 
listened to and is capable of making a difference as much for whom he is as for the quality of 
his ideas and insights. 
 No-one, of course, is more aware of this than Habermas himself, not least because a 
central concern of his academic work has been with the contribution of various roles – 
including that of the intellectual – and of the modes of communication associated with these 
roles, in the development of public opinion and of a public sphere more generally, and thus of 
modern forms of democracy. 1  With that awareness has come an acute sense of the 
responsibilities - the opportunities and privileges, the dangers and potential abuses - 
associated with the role of the public intellectual.  Even his most quotidian interventions are 
never less than conscious of that responsibility – crafted to influence opinion in a particular 
direction but always mindful of the overall integrity of his thought. 
Yet patently, this double role, and which is more significant in any particular context, 
has a bearing upon how we read Habermas. To draw another crude generalization, his 
growing interest in the global political order of international law and international institutions, 
culminating in a body of work2  of which his essay in the present volume is a concise 
statement,3 falls more on the public intellectual side of the divide. We do not have to look 
hard to see certain connections and continuities with his deeper intellectual concerns. Yet the 
main trigger of these interventions has been a series of palpable crises in the international 
order, culminating in the split amongst the Western powers and within the international 
institutions over which they have long held sway, over the war in Iraq, and their main purpose 
has been to offer ways of rebuilding a morally defensible and institutionally efficacious 
structure of transnational norms in the here and now along cosmopolitan lines. Accordingly, 
                                                          
1
  See in particular, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (trans. by Thomas Burger)  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 
2
  Der  gespaltene Westen (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag 2004). To be published in English as The 
Divided West. 
3
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when assessing his contribution to this debate,  I am not so  concerned with  the detailed roots 
of that contribution in his intellectual word-view, or what it might say about shifts and 
tensions within that world-view - although as we shall see these are by no means irrelevant to 
the task at hand. Rather, I am concerned with the cosmopolitan position itself, and how the 
manner in which he has adopted and defended it as a particular and - not least for his 
endorsement - increasingly influential way of understanding and responding to the present 
difficulties of the international order highlights both its strengths and weaknesses.    
2. What Cosmopolitanism is not 
To understand the widespread attraction of the cosmopolitan position, and also to begin to 
appreciate its weaknesses, we must appreciate that first and foremost it is typically defined in 
negative terms – through the forms of diagnoses and treatment it rejects rather than those it 
endorses. Here Habermas’s own approach is instructive of a broader tendency.  One of the 
rejected alternatives to cosmopolitanism, and the one with which Habermas is primarily 
concerned in his contribution to this volume, is a kind of hegemonic liberalism based upon a 
unipolar American–dominated  world order.  “Pax America”,4 as viewed by Habermas, is 
committed to the pursuit of the liberal goals of equal freedom under the rule of law in all the 
states of the world, but rejects faithful conformity to the procedures and substance of 
international law as the best way of delivering that disaggregated  liberal world order. As 
Habermas is aware,5 beyond the  Pax America  option – the “moralization of international 
politics”6 in the name of liberalism and at the behest of the world’s most powerful state in 
military, economic and technological terms - there lie markedly more unpalatable alternatives. 
One would be a neo-liberal global market society where states, and indeed international law 
other than those negative market-making rules necessary to ensure the global economy, 
would be marginalized. Another would be a Negri-esque dystopia of scattered imperial rule, 
with a shifting ‘coalition of the willing’ (and able) asserting their power and interests over the 
majority of the world states and peoples, and law used strategically to serve particular 
interests rather than as a universal and universally accountable code. A final alternative would 
be a global Hobbesian order, in which unipolar might is right and the capacity of unipolar 
might to produce a negative peace is the first purpose and stabilizing force of law, all other 
considerations and objectives being  subordinated to what is required, or professed to be 
required, to meet that primary objective. 
The list of alternatives provided by Habermas is strategically astute in at least two 
senses. First, it is noteworthy that in placing most emphasis on the liberal version of Pax 
America, he foregrounds the most charitable interpretation of American intentions. What is at 
issue here is “empire lite”7 rather than a new realism adapted to the conditions of unipolarity, 
in which, as suggested above, a Hobbesian world order dominated by the most powerful state 
replaces the traditional anarchy – or precarious balance -  of competing sovereign states and 
coalitions.  In many ways, this is a laudable approach. Take the alternative which most 
closely challenges your own position in terms of practicability and desirability, and to the 
extent that you can provide persuasive arguments against that ‘second-best’ alternative and 
demonstrate how your own position fairs better, you reinforce the foundations of your own 
position. Yet there is also a danger lurking at the margins. To assume that America may be a 
                                                          
4
 Ibid. 1. 
5
  Above n2 at 178 et seq. See also the discussion in B. Fassbender, “The Meaning of International 
Constitutional Law” in R St. J. Macdonald and D.M. Johnston (eds) Towards World Constitutionalism: issues in 
the Legal Ordering of the World Community (The Hague: Nijhoff, 2005). 
6
  Above n3, at 1. 
7
 M. Ignatieff,  Empire Lite (London:Vintage, 2003). 
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“well-intentioned” 8 hegemon committed to global liberal ends as opposed to a self-interested 
hegemon committed to its own ends, even if Habermas is at pains to insist that this is only an 
assumption – a “best-case scenario”9 – is already to concede a lot to happy circumstance and 
the highly contingent  prospects of a convergence favourable to cosmopolitan universalism, 
and so  perhaps to lower somewhat the practical bar to making ones own case.10  
Secondly, in using such broad brush strokes to dramatize the various alternatives, 
Habermas carves out a very loosely-defined space for his own cosmopolitan preference. 
While there a clear advantages in this approach, in particular in its contemplation of a 
generously inclusive consensus in favour of the cosmopolitan position, or at least against all 
the others, it also begs two major questions. In the first place, there is a practical question. In 
concentrating on the undesirable alternatives to cosmopolitanism, Habermas tends to draw 
attention away from the historical difficulties of cosmopolitanism itself. This may seem 
unfair, since at various points in his article, and even in its title, Habermas makes it clear that 
in endorsing the cosmopolitan position and the complementary project of the 
constitutionalization of international law, he is talking about the defence and development of 
an existing approach to international law and the global order rather than a new beginning. 
What is more, Habermas is at pains to point out that whatever prominence the cosmopolitan 
approach gained in response to the three major ruptures of the twentieth century – the two 
World Wars and the end of Cold War bipolarity – was always fragile and reversible.11  Yet 
beyond the stark invocation of a new American hegemony and its apotheosis in the second 
Gulf War, very little attention is given to the explanation, as opposed to the description of 
cosmopolitanism instability, and thus to the ways in which such an explanation may cast 
doubt on the renewal or sustainability of the cosmopolitan project. Here again, as with the 
emphasis upon the similarity between cosmopolitanism and its most plausible (or least 
unpalatable) rival - hegemonic liberalism, and on the possibility of their reconciliation or 
convergence, Habermas subtly downplays the practical obstacles to the renewal and 
development of the cosmopolitan tradition. 
The second question which is begged by an approach which starts from a negative 
definition is of a more fundamental conceptual nature. What, then, is cosmopolitanism, even 
broadly defined, and how might it provide a coherent answer to the problems of the global 
order? As we shall see, the pursuit of these questions also deepens our understanding of the 
relationship between cosmopolitanism and the other candidate global visions, and in so doing 
places the practical problems in the way of cosmopolitan renewal in a more challenging light. 
3.  The Tensions of Cosmopolitanism 
Histories of cosmopolitan thought have often stressed that the study of 
cosmopolitanism comes in different guises, asking different questions and providing different 
answers. For example, in one influential essay, Pauline Kleingeld has focused on a 
particularly rich developmental phase in cosmopolitan thinking, namely 18th century 
Germany and the age of Kant and Fichte, in order to identify six different streams of 
                                                          
8
 Above n3, at 18. 
9
 Ibid 
10
  This is not intended as a cynical dismissal of liberal internationalist opinion in the United States. Rather, it is 
to suggest that a healthy skepticism about the prospects of that opinion prevailing has to start from a position 
which looks closely at the actual trends and the social, political and economic  forces which would favour one 
trend over another, rather than simply positing  the liberal and non-liberal option as bald (and in the absence of 
further specification, presumptively equally plausible) alternatives.   
11
  Above n3, at 9. 
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cosmopolitan thought.12  Of course, what such rich diversity demonstrates, first and foremost, 
is that for many cosmopolitanism has been and remains an attractive concept, and that like 
any concept that has engaged widespread academic interests and, moreover,    has crossed 
over into practical political discourse, it becomes difficult and necessarily controversial to try 
to recover or develop some single or coherent dominant meaning from the historical record – 
a canonical set of questions and answers. Yet such diversity does not imply intellectual 
bankruptcy or redundancy It does not follow that cosmopolitanism, when applied in a 
particular time and place to a particular set of practical problems cannot provide a broadly 
persuasive framework of understanding and repertoire of solutions, or that any such approach 
is vitiated by its inconsistency with any particular aspect of the historical record. For example, 
many cosmopolitan thinkers, including Habermas himself, find both inspiration and authority 
in Kant, but this does not mean that their approach is or should be assiduously faithful to the 
Kantian original. Critics in their turn are entitled to point to aspects of Kant’s cosmopolitan 
that may prove unattractive to contemporary cosmopolitan tastes, including   his embrace of a 
Western-centric model of civilized development as a mark of full membership of the 
cosmopolitan order, or the retreat in his later work from the idea that a league of states should 
have any coercive powers which trump individual state sovereignty.13 But the point of such 
exposure cannot be to charge that all contemporary cosmopolitans are guilty by association of 
Kant’s original sins, or, conversely, that if they diverge from Kant they can no longer call 
themselves cosmopolitan. Rather, it is simply to counsel against indiscriminate appropriation 
of the Kantian tradition, and to shift the burden onto Kant’s discriminating heirs to explain 
the basis on which a selective appropriation can be defended.14 
The diverse nature of the cosmopolitan tradition, however, does point us indirectly to 
one important discipline which a cosmopolitan theory for our times cannot escape. 
Contemporary cosmopolitanism, as exemplified by the recent interventions of Habermas, is a 
politically engaged approach, and so must deal with all streams or dimensions of 
cosmopolitan thinking insofar as they are relevant to such engagement. On that basis, we can 
point to at least four sets of questions, and sets of candidate answers, which a comprehensive 
cosmopolitan vision must embrace. 
First, and axiomatically, there is a moral dimension to cosmopolitanism. A limiting 
condition of cosmopolitan thought is the belief that at least in some measure and for some 
purposes all human beings form a single moral community, and that they  owe each other 
certain obligations just in virtue of their being members of that single moral community.15 It 
does not necessarily follow that common nationality, language, religion, customs or other 
identitive traits should not be the basis of special or additional obligations, but at least some 
obligations must flow from our common humanity.16 Secondly, and closely related, there is a 
                                                          
12
  Namely, moral, political, legal, cultural, economic and romantic cosmopolitanism. See P. Kleingeld, “Six 
Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany” (1999) 60 Journal of the History of Ideas 
505-24. 
13
  Above n3, at 6. 
14
  See e.g.  J. Tully, “The Kantian Idea of Europe: Critical and Cosmopolitan Perspectives  in  A. Pagden (ed), 
The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2002).58.rom U 
15
  See e.g. Kleingeld, above n12, 506-508  
16
   A distinction may be drawn between strict and moderate cosmopolitans, with only the former holding that 
the community of all human beings is the exclusive reference point for moral community. See e.g.  P. Kleingeld 
and E. Brown "Cosmopolitanism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2002 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/cosmopolitanism/). Yet many anti-cosmopolitan 
arguments start from the premise that “true’ cosmopolitanism is necessarily and exclusively of the strict variety, 
so tending to produce excessively stylized accounts of  the difference  between communitarian and other local-
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cultural dimension to cosmopolitanism. Consistent with its belief in a core of moral 
obligations which are universally valid and binding, cosmopolitanism must deny that more 
parochial identities and attachments and the beliefs – or  culture  - which flows from these 
identities and attachments, should be the sole measure of our morality or should indicate the 
boundaries of concern  beyond which no moral obligations are owed. Yet just because 
cosmopolitanism contests the comprehensive moral authority of any particular culture, it must 
also recognize the value of all, and so respect the rich cultural diversity that we find in the 
world. This recognition cannot of course be so robust that it leads to cultural relativism, since 
that would deny the very universalism based on common humanity which lies at the moral 
core of cosmopolitanism, but, equally, it must be sufficiently robust to ensure against cultural 
imperialism, where minority or subaltern groups or the preferences associated with these 
groups are denied the respect and consideration necessary to satisfy the universal obligations 
owed to them as to everyone else. So a via media between cultural relativism and cultural 
imperialism must always be carved out, although this will vary greatly depending upon what 
is deemed to be embraced within the universal core and what practical measures are judged to 
provide an optimal accommodation of core values and culturally specific preferences. 17 
Thirdly, then, given that it requires a committed and detailed programme of 
intervention, .there is always an institutional dimension to cosmopolitanism. What political 
and legal arrangements are necessary to deliver cosmopolitan virtue? In turn, this implies a 
fourth dimension of cosmopolitanism, which we might call the social dimension. Given the 
fact of widespread cultural parochialism, how do we de encourage or maintain the kinds of 
attachments necessary for people to recognize and meet their wider cosmopolitan obligations? 
How, in other words, might the legal and political arrangements necessary to deliver 
cosmopolitan difference be generated and effectively implemented in the face of anti-
cosmopolitan tendencies?  
In addressing these four dimensions in the round, the cosmopolitan must be aware of 
both the dependencies and the tensions at work in their mutual relations. Clearly, the 
possibility of developing effective institutional measures depends on the existence of the 
appropriate social and political attitudes, and reciprocally, such attitudes might be stabilized 
or reinforced by the right institutional measures. And the value of both depends on the 
articulation of the appropriate moral and cultural foundations, and in particular on the vexed 
question of the optimal balance between universal values and standards and the recognition of 
legitimate diversity. On the one hand, the more ambitious the universal cosmopolitan core, 
the more difficult to generate the social preconditions, and the attendant institutional structure 
necessary to deliver that core. On the other hand, the more restrictive the core, the greater the 
danger that no meaningful cosmopolitan programme may be generated and implemented.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
centred  theories on the one hand  and the cosmopolitan alternative on the other. On this view, a moderate 
cosmopolitanism in which different  categories or strengths of moral obligation are demarcated to different 
levels of community, is either a contradiction in terms, or merely a short term holding position on the way to  
full or strict model – an expedient  demanded by the temporary  persistence of special  local cultures or political 
ties.  What is not seriously countenanced here is a position held by many, including Habermas himself (see text 
below) – namely  a principled moderate cosmopolitanism  in which  our  associative obligations  are properly 
layered  according to the  thickness or proximity of the association  in question.   For a recent example of the 
tendency to squeeze moderate cosmopolitanism, see T. Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice” (2005) 33 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 113-147,  esp. 119-120. 
17
  On the difficult choices thus faced ,and the extent to which such reconciliation depends upon imaginative 
institutional design, see J. Waldron, “Status versus Equality: The Accommodation of Difference” in the present 
volume.  See also, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State,” Habermas’s  perhaps 
surprisingly strong response to Charles Taylor’s ”The Politics Of Recognition,” both in  Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition  rev. ed. (A. Gutmann (ed) (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1994).   
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In these various dangers, moreover, we can see the roots of the various flawed and 
failed alternative visions of the international order. An ambitious cosmopolitan  programme 
always courts  controversy and failure – both at the deep level of reconciling moral 
universalism with cultural recognition and at the practical level of generating  the requisite 
global commitment - as  is indicated the highly uneven progress of a system of  international 
law, which, at least since the establishment of the United Nations and the development of its 
various rights jurisdictions, has sought to treat individuals and not just states as the direct 
‘cosmopolitan’ subjects of international law. The prospect or reality of failure may in turn 
encourage an ersatz universalism, an orthodoxy which in the name of the general interest 
privileges a dominant set of interests and values and is insufficiently sensitive towards or 
tolerant of other interests and values, as in the liberal hegemony of Pax America. 
Alternatively, any broad-ranging cosmopolitan vision may simply be erased from the agenda. 
Too much may give way to too little – to a new one-world Hobbesian realism, or a narrow 
and incoherent instrumentalism of the (shifting) coalition of the powerful, or to a permissive   
neo-liberal minimalism. 
The most basic conceptual analysis of cosmopolitanism, therefore, reveals an 
uncomfortable truth. Much of the prima facie attraction of the cosmopolitan perspective rests 
upon the unacceptability of the alternatives. Yet  certain tensions within cosmopolitanism 
itself, both in its basic moral structure which seeks to reconcile universalism with a defence 
of cultural diversity and in the relationship between this set of concerns and its practical (i.e., 
institutional and social) dimensions, suggest that cosmopolitanism has an inherent tendency 
to collapse into one or other of these various unacceptable alternatives. On this view, 
moreover, the particular proximity of cosmopolitanism to the claimed moral universalism of a 
liberal Pax America seems as much a threat as an opportunity, the former as likely to dissolve 
into the latter as to prevail over it. 
While, as suggested, Habermas may not present these questions of basic orientation in 
as harsh a light as they merit, he is by no means unaware of the precariousness of the 
cosmopolitan project. How, then might   cosmopolitanism address its weaknesses, and 
develop a more robust answer to the opposing visions of global order? The strategy suggested 
by Habermas himself begins by attempting a more precise specification of cosmopolitanism’s 
contemporary challenges and opportunity and ends by placing centre-stage the 
constitutionalization of international law. 
4. The Turn to International Constitutional Law 
(a) Fleshing out Cosmopolitanism 
In order to understand the allure of the constitutionalization approach, we need to 
focus more closely on what is required for cosmopolitanism to prevail over the competing 
visions of global order. Cosmopolitans must simultaneously solve a practical problem and a 
moral problem. They must explain how the presumptively “thin’ social commitments 
associated with a set of common obligations at the global level will withstand the competing 
imperatives of ‘thicker’ local obligations, and also how these common global commitments 
may emerge from a process in which diverse interests and perspectives are taken into account 
and embody norms which are seen as fair from that diversity of perspectives. 
Habermas’s initial response to these questions is twofold. 18  First, like the majority of 
contemporary cosmopolitans, his view of what should be attempted at the global level is 
modest. He envisages neither a federal world government in which the states are the 
subordinate units, nor a configuration short of a world state in which those norms which 
operate transnationally are nonetheless primarily located at the widest global level. Rather, he 
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  Above, n3, at 6-8. 
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opts for a “multilevel system”19 in which the main site of transnational norm generation and 
application is the continental regime.  These continental regimes, of which the most 
developed model is the European Union, would address “the difficult problems of a global 
domestic politics.” That is to say, in a world in which it is increasingly beyond the capacity of 
states acting individually (with the partial exception of the United States) to achieve effective 
normative control over the forces of globalization, these  continental regimes would avoid the 
dangers of international (de)regulatory competition by resolving  to act in supranational 
concert - undertaking the business of re-regulating the global economy by balancing the 
demands of mobile capital to minimize product and production costs against the need to 
retain reasonable levels of social and environmental  regulation. The properly global level, 
organized around a reformed United Nation, would in contrast have a far more restricted 
mandate; namely to  “fulfill the vital but strictly circumscribed functions of securing peace 
and implementing human rights at the supranational level.”  
 Secondly, however modestly circumscribed, it is vital to Habermas that the global 
mandate operates within a faithfully legal register.  In the final analysis, his objection to an 
ethically grounded unilateralism is grounded in the “logic of practical discourse.”20 Even with 
the best intentions, the United States will encounter “insuperable cognitive obstacles” in 
seeking to separate “its own national interests from the universalizable interests that could be 
shared by all the other nations.” Its proposals and preferences must instead be tested in a 
process of prior argumentation in which all affected parties can participate and in which the 
requirement of consensual decision-making require each to assume and consider the 
perspective of all the others. Only a legal process and discourse, one in which both the 
legitimacy of norm generation and the authority of norm application depends upon – indeed 
implies – universalizability, can guarantee an appropriately inclusive structure of ongoing 
argumentation and a suitable general scheme of implementation. 
In both of these moves – the specification of a modest role for global regulation and 
the emphasis that this should take place within the universalizable register of law, we see a 
strong connection with longstanding Habermasian themes. The modesty of the global role 
reflects Habermas’s conviction that justly vested and effective political capacity depends 
upon conscious and reflexive choice by particular political associations or communities of 
attachment. Habermas has long been an opponent not only of national or any other form of 
particularism  as an exclusive moral basis for political community – the denial of which, as 
we have seen, is a basic article of cosmopolitan faith – but also of  national or other local 
particularisms as the exclusive practical basis for  polity-making.21 In particular, his work on 
the constitutional progress of the European Union,22 and on the possibility of adapting the 
ideas of constitutional patriotism – of the commitment to universal ideas in the context of a 
particular bounded political community – to the regional level, speaks to his faith in this 
possibility, and of course that stress remains in the present work in the importance he 
attributes to the intermediate tier of the  multi-tiered architecture for global justice. 
Nevertheless, even at the intermediate level some emphasis on the active appropriation of 
universal themes by a particular community already equipped with the rudiments of a 
                                                          
19
 Ibid  7. 
20
 Ibid 18 
21
 See, in particular, his two collections, The Postnational Constellation  (trans. by M. Pensky)  (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2001) and  The Inclusion of the Other (trans. by C. Cronin)  (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998). 
22
  See  e.g. The Inclusion of the Other, above n21, Part III; see also , J. Habermas, "Why Europe Needs A 
Constitution"  (2001) New Left Review Sep-Oct (11). 
Neil Walker 
8 
particular  self-understanding remains,23 and the difficulties of imagining this at the global 
level are reflected in the limited jurisdiction he envisages there. Yet he does not shy away 
from what is entailed at the global level, however modestly circumscribed - hence the explicit 
connection with his famous theory of communicative rationality,24 with law as the carrier of 
that rationality and the means by which the requirement of universal validity is redeemed. 
If we push a little harder, however, we can see that the tensions that Habermas sets out 
to resolve, as any cosmopolitan must, remain stubbornly present. The reservations he clearly 
has over the development of a sufficiently ‘thick’ social commitment at the global level are 
not easily answered by limiting the scope of global jurisdiction or by a strong requirement of 
juridification.  As regards the former, even if we could plausibly limit the global regime to 
conflict resolution and human rights – and this neglects the fact that the global (as opposed to 
regional) normative regime is in truth much broader than this – these norms are themselves 
very wide-ranging (in the case of human rights) and deeply controversial (in the case of both 
human rights and conflict resolution).  
To focus only on conflict resolution, as Habermas clearly acknowledges, 25  the 
breakdown of the collective security system over Iraq is no one-off failing, but symptomatic 
of a broader difficulty which has been highlighted, ironically enough, by the very fact that the 
end of the Cold War stalemate, in which the invocation of the veto by one or other 
superpower was a common occurrence, held out the prospect of a more effective framework. 
Over the last 15 years, the Security Council has indeed been more active, in particular in 
response to many of the “new wars”26 of internal conflict or oppression in weak states and, 
latterly, in relation to new transnational terrorists threats within and across but not 
coterminous with such weak states. But it  has also been bitterly criticized both for its acts 
and for its omissions – its  endorsement of questionable intervention in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan as much as its failure to intervene, or at least to intervene timeously, in  places 
such as Iraq, Kurdistan, Angola,  Nigeria and Sri Lanka.27   According to these critiques, 
deficiencies of procedure and substance feed off each other. On the one hand, selective 
membership of the Security Council and the existence of the veto power make it too easy 
both to endorse and to prevent intervention. On the other hand, both of the major grounds for 
intervention -  the right to individual or collective self-defence under Art.51 of the UN 
Charter and the collective intervention system under Ch. VII where the existence of a threat 
to international peace or act of aggression is unanimously determined -  are highly contested 
– witness the attempt by the United States to stretch the former to encompass a right to pre-
emptive or anticipatory self-defence in Iraq, or various attempts to supplement the latter with 
a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In a vicious spiral of declining trust and 
confidence, these doctrinal disputes and indeterminacies both reflect and serve to reinforce 
lack of confidence in the procedural underpinnings of the system. 28 
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24
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In the face of these difficulties, the invocation of a communicatively rational model of 
juridification of global norms may seem  to restate the problem rather than answer it.  If the 
legitimate authority of cosmopolitan law depends upon a virtuous connection between the 
inclusiveness of the generative procedures and the  universal applicability and reciprocal  
defensibility of the outcomes,  then it is the absence of  procedures and outcomes thus 
characterizable which stands out, as well as the underlying difficulty of locating the social 
forces in the ‘thin’ air of global culture necessary to motivate the common effort  required to 
put such a structure in place. 
(b) The Constitutional Gambit 
How, if at all, does the invocation of a constitutional basis to international law help to 
overcome this impasse?  In his self-confessedly selective treatment of the constitutional 
features of the UN system, Habermas picks out three features; namely the explicit connection 
between the purpose of securing peace and that of advancing human rights, the linking of the 
prohibition on the use of violence with a credible system of prosecution and sanction, and the 
inclusive character of the world organization and the universal validity claims it makes for the 
law it generates. 29  So, to abstract from these features, the constitutionality or 
constitutionalism of international law seems to inhere partly in the substantive quality of the 
norms generated, partly in their institutional efficacy, and partly in their universalizability – 
as a matter of both process and outcomes.  
Tellingly, one or more of these general ‘constitutionalizing ‘ features  figure in the 
growing tide of attempts by  international lawyers themselves to attribute a constitutional 
quality or foundation to  international law.30 Without going into the details of such attempts, 
their common theme, as Fassbender notes, is to view international law as a “progressive 
movement,”31  simultaneously looking backwards and forwards in an attempt to find and 
argue for the consolidation or reinforcement of some characteristic which deepens 
international co-operation. Sometimes, that argument is explicitly about substantive norms, as 
in the invocation of international law’s progressive grounding in human rights.32  Sometimes, 
the argument is primarily institutional, whether in the abstract sense of international law 
developing a  systemic autonomy and integrity  – an internal scheme of hierarchy and 
differentiation in the Kelsenian mode 33 or in the more concrete sense of the development of a 
particular institutional capacity for norm generation and enforcement, as with the advent of 
the United Nations in the second half of the twentieth century.34 Sometimes, and often related 
to the argument about institutional efficacy, the emphasis is upon universal applicability, as in 
the invocation of the peremptory or non-consensual quality of the growing body of rules of 
jus cogens, or the comprehensive reach of obligations erga omnes, 35  although tellingly, 
international lawyers have tended to be less vocal or convincing in arguing for the 
inclusiveness of the process or the commitment to universalizability of the argumentative 
logic of  norm generation.  
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But what is the added value of the invocation of the term ‘constitutional’ to endorse 
the favoured narrative of progress? The common rhetorical purpose seems to be to lend 
additional gravitas to the particular trend or trends in question. In a circular or boot-strapping 
logic, it is the documentation of the supposedly progressive trend or trends which   justifies a 
‘constitutional’ attribution, and it is the constitutional attribution which then both dignifies 
the existing state of affairs and authorizes further progress.  Such a discursive move carries 
with it both dangers and opportunities, and it is on how these dangers are approached and 
opportunities negotiated that the prospects of a cosmopolitan-inspired constitutionalization of 
international law depends. 
On the one hand, the dangers are obvious. These are that the community of 
international lawyers, and whoever may exploit the community of international lawyers to 
their ends, become the self-appointed judges, guardians or beneficiaries of ‘progress.’ Just 
because international law displays, or may be interpreted as displaying, an increasing 
doctrinal concern with certain substantive values, or an increasing institutional depth and 
efficacy, or an increasing universality of norm application, is of course in and of itself no 
authority for the continuation of these trends. If, as we have seen, false universalism is a 
charge which can be laid against those who invoke a universal morality beyond law, it can 
also be laid against those who attribute such a morality, or some other special basis of 
authority to law.36  In the final analysis, whatever arguments can be made for any or all of the 
candidate  ‘constitutionalizing’ trends have to be premised upon some distinctive feature of 
the trends themselves, and cannot be reduced to the tautology that they contribute to or are 
interpreted as contributing to the formal intensification or advancement  of something called 
international law. Arguably, if all the constitutional label can provide is an unjustified patina 
of authority, it is either useless, or,  to the extent that it deflects attention from the task of 
independent justification of the structure and content of international law and  lends false 
comfort or confidence,  worse than useless. 
Yet, on further inquiry,  the constitutionalization of international law may signify 
something additional to these ‘progressive’ trends,  which in turn may transform how we 
view these  trends themselves - and here Habermas has one final card to play.  Alongside his 
specific references to the United Nations Charter, Habermas does also mention 
constitutionalism at a more general level at a number of points in his text.  The oft-repeated 
phrase is that of a “political constitution of world society.”  Although he does not develop this 
oblique  reference to the social dimension of the cosmopolitan project, here Habermas is 
broaching, however tentatively and despite his misgivings,  the possibility of the generation 
of a particular community of attachment and political association at the global level to 
complement that known at the state level, and, more provisionally, at the regional level. Let 
us at least speculate, he seems to imply, that we might develop something that looked like a 
community mobilizing constitutional process at the global level to match those we are 
familiar with at other levels. Let us at least be alive to the possibility that the ‘constitutional’ 
in  international constitutional law be conceived of not just as an objective record interpreted 
and dignified as such by the expert witnesses of international law, but also as an inter-
subjective process of constitutive imagining by all those affected or potentially affected by it - 
a “world society” in the making. 
But, it may be objected, is this not simply to beg the question yet again? If no such 
sense of world society – or community of single attachment dedicated to the pursuit and 
protection of global common goods along cosmopolitan lines, however narrow, already exists, 
then are we not fated to an infinitely regressive search  if we try to discover or institutionalize 
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the motivation behind the  motivation to put things thus in common? On that view “the 
constitution of world society”   becomes just one more empty play on words, one more 
hollow exhortation lacking either a mobilizing force and medium or a practical context of 
action.  
 Yet the charge of absence of mobilizing potential may be to underestimate the 
generative power of symbols. If we look at the current extended debate over a European 
Constitution and its ratification, whatever may finally transpire the supranational 
constitutional register has in the course of a few short years been profoundly transformed 
from its dusty origins as a technical discussion  about the consolidation and merger of texts 
into a reflexive political process concerning the optimal governance  of a common European 
society. This has been in some small part at least because of the loaded signification of “c” 
word itself.  Once introduced into the debate the wider, historically resonant   "performative 
meaning"37 of  a constitutional project as a people founding a voluntary association of free 
and equal citizens committed to self-government could be mobilized by those seeking a much 
more inclusive construction of the European polity, and could not easily be gainsaid by those 
with different intentions.38 Why, then, might the promotion of a constitutional discourse not, 
over time and in a series of incremental stages, generate something similar, if more modestly 
circumscribed, on a broader global level?   
If, however, we stay for a moment with the European analogy, this might prompt the 
further objection that even if the requisite political imagination could be sparked by the “c” 
word, the global level, unlike the European level,  lacks a suitably focused context of action -  
that there is nothing similar to the mature and reasonably democratically responsive  
institutional structure and acquis communautaire  which had already built up in  the EU over 
a period of 50 years. But, as we have seen, the global level does not entirely lack 
institutionalization, and here it is instructive to remind ourselves that the United Nations is 
sometimes invoked as a point of reference for the work of reform and re-imagination of 
international constitutionalism. 39   Of course, the UN system, and the large body of 
international law which has been generated since the Second World War directly or indirectly 
under its auspices, clearly lacks the democratic credentials of the EU. Yet, as we have seen, it 
does possess other ‘progressive’ tendencies,  in particular  the increasing emphasis on 
fundamental human rights,  and the commitment to universality of norm application and 
enforcement. A political constitutionalism at the level of norm generation could arguably  
supply the missing democratic  link which would allow  the cosmopolitan virtue of these 
other elements to be properly exploited, and which would provide a model more adjacent to 
Habermas’s ideal of a communicatively rational juridification of global relations. 
5. Conclusion 
All of this, however, raises one final, and perhaps fatal objection. The strategy of 
political constitutionalism, as we have seen, is to take what is already there as materials 
towards the self-constitution of a particular political society and through a work of 
imagination and reform transform it into a more inclusive system of self-government. What is 
already there, then, is by no means the measure of what can be achieved, but it is both a 
necessary precondition and an unavoidable legacy. As the new constitutionalists of 
international law have shown us, there are features of that legacy which both provide a 
platform for a process of political constitutionalism and which may themselves be positively 
transformed by that process. Yet international law is also a project which grew out of the 
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West and which enacted and reflected various phases of Western domination  both in its 
contents and in its  operating procedures.40 Or to put it another way, the false universalism of 
particular interests masquerading as general and the genuine universalism of cosmopolitan 
striving exist side by side and in complex intersections in the evolution of international law,41  
and this creates both an objective problem concerning  the skewed content of its normative 
structure and a perceptual problem concerning the preparedness of historically disadvantaged 
or disempowered group  to trust and engage in any process of political reconstitution. 
 Whether these problems can be overcome is a question which only politics can 
answer, which brings us, finally, full circle to the original ‘negative’ articulation of the global 
cosmopolitan project as the only escape from a series of unpalatable alternatives. On the one 
hand, that negative articulation, as we have seen, is profoundly incomplete, and if relied on 
too much merely serves to obscure and avoid the difficult questions that cosmopolitans must 
address. On the other hand, it remains a minimal guarantor of the cosmopolitan project – an 
emphatic reminder of the unacceptability of what lies in store unless these difficult questions 
are addressed.  
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